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Moments of crisis, whether arising from terrorist attacks, financial meltdowns, or incipient 
pandemics, tend to trigger periods of heightened uncertainty and anxiety for affected 
communities. At such times, it is natural for people to come together in an attempt to make 
sense of their situation and to try to figure out how to respond. In the contemporary era, a major 
part of this process of µcollective sensemaking¶ takes place online.1 The Covid-19 pandemic 
offers the most recent and arguably most striking illustration of the importance of online 
information during a period of crisis.2 After all, human health depends not only on readily 
accessible health care, but also on µaccess to accurate information about the nature of the threats 
DQGWKHPHDQVWRSURWHFWRQHVHOIRQH¶VIDPLO\DQGRQH¶VFRPPXQLW\¶.3  
 
During a speech delivered in mid-February 2020, the Director-General of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) observed that communities around the world were confronting not only 
the spread of the novel coronavirus, but also an µinfodemic¶ caused by an overabundance of 
information ± some accurate, some not ± that makes it challenging to identify trustworthy 
sources and reliable guidance about Covid-19.4 At the epicentre of this infodemic are online 
platforms. Over the course of the past decade, a small number of platforms have grown to 
become dominant and essential channels of online communication for a wide range of services, 
 
1
  Kate Starbird, µ5HIOHFWLQJRQWKH&RYLG-,QIRGHPLFDVD&ULVLV,QIRUPDWLFV5HVHDUFKHU¶Medium, 9 March 
2020) < https://onezero.medium.com/reflecting-on-the-covid-19-infodemic-as-a-crisis-informatics-
researcher-ce0656fa4d0a> accessed 17 May 2020.  
2
  While the present paper focuses on challenges associated with the online information ecosystem, it is 
important to recognise that the COVID-19 crisis has amplified a wide range of well-established controversies 
associated with the online environment, ranging from Internet shutdowns and the digital divide to intrusive 
data surveillance and hostile cyberattack operations. See, for example, Barrie Sander and Luca Belli, 
µ&29,'- &\EHU 6XUYHLOODQFH 1RUPDOLVDWLRQ DQG +XPDQ 5LJKWV /DZ¶ Opinio Juris, 1 April 2020) 
<http://opiniojuris.org/2020/04/01/covid-19-symposium-covid-19-cyber-surveillance-normalisation-and-
human-rights-law/> accessed 17 May 2020/DXUD'H1DUGLVDQG-HQQLIHU'DVNDOµ6RFLHW\¶VGHSHQGHQFHRQ
WKH LQWHUQHW  F\EHU LVVXHV WKH FRURQDYLUXV OD\V EDUH¶ The Conversation, 27 March 2020) < 
https://theconversation.com/societys-dependence-on-the-internet-5-cyber-issues-the-coronavirus-lays-bare-
133679> accessed 17 May 2020. 
3
  8QLWHG1DWLRQV+XPDQ5LJKWV2IILFHRIWKH+LJK&RPPLVVLRQHUµCOVID-19: Governments must promote 
DQG SURWHFW DFFHVV WR DQG IUHH IORZ RI LQIRUPDWLRQ GXULQJ SDQGHPLF¶ OHCHR, 19 March 2020) < 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25729&LangID=E> accessed 
17 May 2020.  
4
  :RUOG +HDOWK 2UJDQLVDWLRQ µ0XQLFK 6HFXULW\ &RQIHUHQFH¶ WHO, 15 January 2020) 
<https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/munich-security-conference> accessed 17 May 2020). See also, 
:RUOG+HDOWK2UJDQLVDWLRQµ0DQDJLQJ(SLGHPLFV.H\)DFWV$ERXW0DMRU'HDGO\'LVHDVHV¶ (WHO, 2018) 
34 (defining an µinfodemic¶ as µthe rapid spread of information of all kinds, including rumours, gossip and 
unreliable information¶). 
including marketplaces (e.g. Amazon), social networking (e.g. Facebook), search (e.g. 
Google), image-sharing (e.g. Instagram), video-sharing (e.g. YouTube), and microblogging 
(e.g. Twitter). Fuelled by surveillance-based business models, platforms are not passive 
conduits of online information, but active governors of user-generated content,5 influencing the 
categories of content that are allowed and prohibited (permissibility), as well as how content is 
ranked, amplified, and organised (visibility).6  
 
In this short reflection, we identify different dimensions of the Covid-19 infodemic (1), 
examine how platform governance has evolved in response to the crisis (2), and reflect on what 
the Covid-19 crisis reveals about the relationship between online platforms, international law, 
and the prospect of regulation (3), before offering some concluding remarks (4). 
 
1  The Covid-19 Infodemic 
Ushering in a world of social distancing and self-isolation, the global spread of Covid-19 has 
intensified societal reliance on the internet in general, and online platforms in particular. During 
this period of growing digital dependency, how online platforms govern user-generated content 
has taken on a heightened significance. When the Director-General of the WHO referred to the 
dangers posed by the Covid-19 infodemic, he failed to specify the different types of information 
challenges associated with online platforms during the crisis. Drawing on a conceptual 
framework developed by Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan, it is possible to distinguish 
three types of µinformation disorder¶:7 disinformation, misinformation, and malinformation.  
 
Disinformation refers to the intentional creation and/or dissemination of verifiably false or 
misleading information, typically by organised state or non-state actors.8 The motives 
underpinning disinformation campaigns tend to be varied, ranging from sowing discord or 
exploiting societal fears to interfering with public policies or securing an economic advantage 
± whether directly or indirectly.9 In the context of the Covid-19 crisis, coordinated 
disinformation campaigns have sought to frame vulnerable minorities as the cause of the 
pandemic, and to fuel distrust in the ability of public health institutions to respond effectively 
 
5
  .DWH.ORQLFNµ7KH1HZ*RYHUQRUV7KH3HRSOH5XOHVDQG3URFHVVHV*RYHUQLQJ2QOLQH6SHHFK¶
131 Harvard Law Review 1598. 
6
  Tarleton Gillespie, Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, Content Moderation, and the Hidden Decisions 
that Shape Social Media (Yale University Press 2018) 18. 
7
  Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan, Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for 
Research and Policy Making (Council of Europe 2017) 20. For a different but equally useful typology, see 
0DUNR0LODQRYLF µ9LUDO0LVLQIRUPDWLRQ DQG WKH)UHHGRPRI([SUHVVLRQ3DUW ,,¶ EJIL Talk!, 13 April 
2020) < https://www.ejiltalk.org/viral-misinformation-and-the-freedom-of-expression-part-ii/> accessed 17 
May 2020 (distinguishing viral misinformation in terms of content, source (state actors, organized non-state 
actors, individuals acting spontaneously or organically), target audience (in-groups and out-groups), and 
motives (sincere or insidious)). 
8
  European Commission, Communication ± Tackling Online Disinformation: A European Approach (COM, 
26 April 2018) 3-4.  
9
  $FFHVV1RZ µ)LJKWLQJ 0LVLQIRUPDWLRQ DQG 'HIHQGLQJ )UHH ([SUHVVLRQ 'XULQJ &29,'-19: 
5HFRPPHQGDWLRQV IRU 6WDWHV¶ Access Now, April 2020) 11 < 
https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2020/04/Fighting-misinformation-and-defending-free-
expression-during-COVID-19-recommendations-for-states-1.pdf> accessed 17 May 2020. 
to the crisis.10 Importantly, the precise narrative promoted as part of a disinformation operation 
will typically vary depending on the target audience.11 Russian disinformation campaigns 
targeting domestic audiences, for example, have tended to describe the novel coronavirus as a 
form of foreign aggression, whereas those targeting international audiences have generally 
focused on conspiracy theories about µglobal elites¶ weaponizing or exploiting the virus for 
their own ends. 
 
Although disinformation remains an important concern with respect to the novel coronavirus, 
a leaked report by the European External Action Service concluded that µthe more pressing 
challenge¶ for public health in this context has been misinformation ± namely, the unintentional 
spread of false or misleading information.12 During fast-paced crisis situations, it is not 
uncommon for experts to take extra care with their public messaging in an effort to ensure 
accuracy and reduce misinterpretation. Paradoxically, this cautious approach may result in an 
µinformation vacuum¶ into which false or misleading information is ready to fill.13 For example, 
research by the Reuters Institute examining a sample of 225 pieces of misinformation rated 
false or misleading by fact-checkers from January through to the end of March 2020, found 
that 88% of the sample appeared on social media platforms, 59% of the sample involved forms 
of reconfiguration where true information had been spun, reworked, or recontextualised, and 
the largest category of false or misleading claims (appearing in 39% of the sample) concerned 
the actions or policies of public authorities, including government and international bodies like 
the WHO.14 Importantly, the spread of Covid-19 misinformation has not been without 
consequence. Baseless claims linking next generation 5G mobile technology to the novel 
 
10
  (8YV'L6L1)2µ(($66SHFLDO5HSRUW8SGDWH6KRUW$VVHVVPHQWRI1DUUDWLYHVDQG'LVLQIRUPDWLRQDURXQG
the COVID- 3DQGHPLF¶ EUvsDiSiNFO.eu, 1 April 2020) <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-special-report-
update-short-assessment-of-narratives-and-disinformation-around-the-covid-19-pandemic/> accessed 17 
May 2020. 
11
  EUvsDiSiNFO µ(($6 6SHFLDO 5HSRUW 'LVLQIRUPDWLRQ RQ WKH &RURQDYLUXV ± Short Assessment of the 
,QIRUPDWLRQ(QYLURQPHQW¶EUvsDiSiNFO.eu, 19 March 2020) <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-special-report-
disinformation-on-the-coronavirus-short-assessment-of-the-information-environment/> accessed 17 May 
20206HHDOVR6HDQ0DUWLQ0F'RQDOGDQG;LDR0LQDµ&RURQDYLUXV&ULVLV3XVKHV6WDWHVWR4XDUDQWLQH
2QOLQH ,QIRUPDWLRQ¶ Foreign Policy, 14 February 2020) <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/14/wuhan-
virus-censorship-coronavirus-crisis-pushes-states-quarantine-online-information/> accessed 17 May 2020 
(distinguishing µNationalist (Consolidator)¶, µNationalist (Projector)¶ and µDigital Influencer¶ behaviour).  
12
  Jennifer Rankin, µ5XVVLDQPHGLD³VSUHDGLQJ&RYLG-GLVLQIRUPDWLRQ´¶ (The Guardian, 18 March 2020) < 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/18/russian-media-spreading-covid-19-disinformation> 
accessed 17 May 2020. 
13
  6+DUULV$OLDQG)X\XNL.XUDVDZDµ&29,'6RFLDOPHGLDERWKDEOHVVLQJDQGDFXUVHGXULQJcoronavirus 
SDQGHPLF¶The Conversation, 22 March 2020) <https://theconversation.com/covid19-social-media-both-a-
blessing-and-a-curse-during-coronavirus-pandemic-133596> accessed 17 May 2020. Alternatively, an 
information vacuum may result from governments actively deploying broad and vague laws and/or more 
informal pressure to incentivise online platforms to collaterally censor content out of fear of legal or political 
liability. See, for example, .DUPDQ /XFHUR µ&KLQD 5HVSRQGV WR WKH &RURQDYLUXV ZLWK DQ ,URQ *ULS RQ
,QIRUPDWLRQ)ORZ¶Lawfare, 17 March 2020) <https://www.lawfareblog.com/china-responds-coronavirus-
iron-grip-information-flow> accessed 17 May 2020 GLVFXVVLQJKRZ&KLQD¶VVWUXFWXUHVRIFRQWHQWFRQWURO
have hindered the flow of important information concerning the coronavirus and how to stem its spread, 
whilst also encouraging the active creation and dissemination of false or misleading information to fill the 
resulting information vacuum). 
14
  6FRWW%UHQQHQHWDOµ7\SHV6RXUFHVDQG&ODLPVRI&29,'-0LVLQIRUPDWLRQ¶Reuters Institute for the 
Study of Journalism, April 2020) <https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/types-sources-and-claims-covid-
19-misinformation> accessed 17 May 2020. 
coronavirus pandemic, for example, have contributed to real-world social harms, including 
petrol bomb attacks on telephone poles.15 
 
Finally, malinformation refers to the intentional creation and/or dissemination of information 
that is threatening, abusive, discriminatory, harassing or disruptive, which aims to cause harm 
to a person, organisation or state.16 Since the Covid-19 pandemic broke out, there have been 
reports of heightened racist and xenophobic sentiments in many parts of the world, with a 
proliferation of hate speech and stigmatization on online platforms.17 An analysis conducted 
by Al Jazeera, for example, identified thousands of posts on Twitter employing racist 
terminology to describe the novel coronavirus.18 The spread of malinformation can generate a 
number of harms; not only social stigma and the silencing of members of vulnerable groups in 
society, but also discriminatory treatment and acts of violence against them.19 
 
While it is useful to distinguish different types of information disorder for analytical purposes, 
it is important to remember that in practice they tend to overlap and operate in tandem. False 
and misleading information about links between 5G mobile technology and Covid-19, for 
example, appears to have first emerged and spread organically as misinformation, before later 
being amplified as part of organised disinformation campaigns.20  
 
2 The Online Platform Response to the Covid-19 Infodemic 
In recent years, online platforms have witnessed a spate of controversies concerning issues 
ranging from data harvesting and surveillance to online censorship and influence operations. 
Given this increasingly hostile climate, it is notable that measures implemented by online 
platforms in response to the Covid-19 crisis have generated some rare positive headlines for 
the tech sector, even leading some to question whether the novel coronavirus has µkilled the 
techlash¶.21 5HJDUGOHVV RI RQH¶V SHUVSHFWLYH RQ WKDW TXHVWLRQ, it is undeniable that online 
platforms have responded to the Covid-19 infodemic by updating their content policies in 
various ways. 
 
2.1 Partnerships and Collaboration  
Online platforms were quick to recognise the importance of partnerships and collaboration in 
responding to the Covid-19 crisis. For instance, a wide range of platforms have forged 
 
15
  -LP:DWHUVRQDQG$OH[+HUQ µ+RZIDOVHFODLPVDERXWKHDOWK ULVNV VSUHDG LQWR WKHPDLQVWUHDP¶ The 
Guardian, 7 April 2020) < https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/apr/07/how-false-claims-about-
5g-health-risks-spread-into-the-mainstream> accessed 17 May 2020. 
16
  Chris Tenove et al, Digital Threats to Democratic Elections: How Foreign Actors Use Digital Techniques 
to Undermine Democracy (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions 2018) 22-25. 
17
  Article19, Viral Lies: Misinformation and the Coronavirus (Article19 March 2020) 4 < 
https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Coronavirus-final.pdf> accessed 17 May 2020. 
18
   (RJKDQ0DFTXLUHµ$QWL-Asian hate continues to spread online amid COVID-SDQGHPLF¶Al Jazeera, 5 
April 2020) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/anti-asian-hate-continues-spread-online-covid-19-
pandemic-200405063015286.html> accessed 17 May 2020.   
19
  AccessNow (n 9) 16-18. 
20
  Milanovic (n 7).  
21
  6WHYHQ /HY\ µ+DV WKH &RURQDYLUXV .LOOHG WKH 7HFKODVK"¶ WIRED, 20 March 2020) < 
https://www.wired.com/story/plaintext-has-the-coronavirus-killed-the-techlash/> accessed 17 May 2020.   
partnerships with the WHO and other public health institutions to promote authoritative and 
reliable information about Covid-19. Facebook and Instagram, for example, have been showing 
educational pop-ups connecting people to expert health organizations such as the WHO, as 
well as local health authorities, whenever anyone searches for information related to the novel 
coronavirus or taps on a Covid-19 related hashtag.22 Facebook has also launched a Covid-19 
Information Center, which sits at the top of the news feed in several countries and features real-
time updates from national and global health authorities.23 Similarly, Twitter has established a 
dedicated Covid-19 Event page and implemented a Covid-19 search prompt in partnership with 
the WHO and national public agencies in more than 70 countries to ensure that any search for 
information related to Covid-19 is met with credible and authoritative content.24  
 
Online platforms have also collaborated with each other, though the details of such 
arrangements have remained relatively vague to date.25 For instance, Facebook, Google, 
LinkedIn, Microsoft, Reddit, Twitter and YouTube, have released a joint industry statement 
confirming that they are µworking closely together on Covid-19 response efforts¶, including 
µjointly combating fraud and misinformation about the virus, HOHYDWLQJDXWKRULWDWLYHFRQWHQW«, 
and sharing critical updates in coordination with government healthcare agencies around the 
world¶.26 
 
2.2 Moderation Rules and Policies 
Beyond partnerships, online platforms have also revised their moderation rules and policies in 
an effort to address the Covid-19 infodemic. For instance, a range of platforms have updated 
their moderation rules concerning organic content. Twitter, for example, has broadened its 
definition of µharm¶ in order to remove content that contradicts guidance from authoritative 
sources of global and local public health information, including tweets that encourage people 
not to social distance, promote harmful treatments or protection measures, or deny established 
scientific facts about transmission.27 Similarly, Facebook has confirmed that it is removing 
false or misleading Covid-19 content µas an extension of [its] existing policies to remove 
content that could cause physical harm¶.28 Concurrently, it continues to work with a network 
of over 60 fact-checking partners to reduce distribution and to show warning labels with more 
 
22
  1LFN&OHJJµ&RPEDWLQJ&29,'-19 0LVLQIRUPDWLRQ$FURVV2XU$SSV¶Facebook Newsroom, 25 March 
2020) < https://about.fb.com/news/2020/03/combating-covid-19-misinformation/> accessed 17 May 2020.   
23
  Ibid. 
24
  7ZLWWHU ,QF µ&RURQDYLUXV 6WD\LQJ VDIH DQG LQIRUPHG RQ 7ZLWWHU¶ Twitter Blog, 3 April 2020) 
<https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/covid-19.html> accessed 17 May 2020.  
25
  Inter-platform collaboration concerning the governance of online content is not new, with existing 
partnerships including varying degrees of cooperation concerning the removal of child exploitation material, 
terrorist and extremist contentDQGFRRUGLQDWHGLQDXWKHQWLFEHKDYLRXU6HHJHQHUDOO\(YHO\Q'RXHNµ7KH
5LVH RI &RQWHQW &DUWHOV¶ Knight First Amendment Institute, 11 February 2020) < 
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/the-rise-of-content-cartels> accessed 17 May 2020.   
26
  Nick Statt µ0DMRUWHFKSODWIRUPVVD\WKH\¶UH³MRLQWO\FRPEDWLQJIUDXGDQGPLVLQIRUPDWLRQ´DERXW&29,'-
¶The Verge, 16 March 2020) < https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/16/21182726/coronavirus-covid-19-
facebook-google-twitter-youtube-joint-effort-misinformation-fraud> accessed 17 May 2020.   
27
  Twitter Inc (n 24). 
28
  Kang-;LQJ-LQµ.HHSLQJ3HRSOH6DIHDQG,QIRUPHG$ERXWWKH&RURQDYLUXV¶Facebook Newsroom, 9 April 
2020) <https://about.fb.com/news/2020/05/coronavirus/> accessed 17 May 2020.   
context in front of posts that are false but do not directly result in physical harm.29 The impact 
of these policies was demonstrated when Twitter and Facebook decided to remove videos 
posted by Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro in which he endorsed hydroxychloroquine as an 
effective treatment of Covid-19,30 despite their long-standing reticence to take action against 
content posted by state leaders.31 
 
Online platforms have also updated their moderation rules concerning paid content. For 
example, to protect against inflated prices and predatory behaviour Facebook has temporarily 
banned ads intended to create a panic or for products that claim to guarantee a cure or prevent 
people from contracting Covid-19.32 The company has also temporarily banned ads and 
commerce listings for medical face masks, hand sanitizer, disinfecting wipes, and Covid-19 
testing kits.33 In addition, Facebook has committed to giving the WHO as many free ads as 
they need and millions in ad credits to other health authorities.34 Similarly, Twitter has 
prohibited ads with distasteful references to Covid-19, sensational or panic-inducing content, 
inflated prices for products related to Covid-19, and certain products such as facemasks and 
alcohol hand sanitizers.35 Google has also blocked hundreds of thousands of ads attempting to 
capitalize on the Covid-19 pandemic and announced a temporary ban on all ads for medical 
masks and respirators.36 
 
2.3 Enforcement Challenges 
The stricter content measures implemented by online platforms appear to reflect not only the 
clear and present social harm that may result from information disorder concerning Covid-19, 
but also the fact that in many societies there seemed to be, initially at least,37 less partisan 
disagreement than is typically the case concerning many political discussions and debates.38 
 
29
  *X\5RVHQµ$Q8SGDWHRQ2XU:RUNWR.HHS3HRSOH,QIRUPHGDQd Limit Misinformation About COVID-
¶Facebook Newsroom, 16 April 2020) < https://about.fb.com/news/2020/04/covid-19-misinfo-update/> 
 accessed 17 May 2020.   
30
  Jack *RRGPDQDQG&KULVWRSKHU*LOHVµ&RURQDYLUXVDQGFKORURTXLQH,VWKHUHHYLGHQFHLWZRUNV"¶BBC, 28 
April 2020) < https://www.bbc.com/news/51980731> accessed 17 May 2020. 
31
  .LP/\RQVµ7ZLWWHUUHPRYHVWZHHWs by Brazil, Venezuela presidents for violating COVID-FRQWHQWUXOHV¶
(The Verge, 30 March 2020) < https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/30/21199845/twitter-tweets-brazil-
venezuela-presidents-covid-19-coronavirus-jair-bolsonaro-maduro> accessed 17 May 2020. 
32
  Clegg (n 22). 
33
  Jin (n 28). 
34
  Ibid. 
35
  Twitter Inc (n 24). 
36
  6XQGDU 3LFKDL µ&29,'- +RZ ZH¶UH FRQWLQXLQJ WR KHOS¶ The Keyword, 15 March 2020) < 
https://www.blog.google/inside-google/company-announcements/covid-19-how-were-continuing-to-help/> 
accessed 17 May 2020. 
37
  6HHIRUH[DPSOH)UDQN-RUGDQVDQG(OHQD%HFDWRURVµ0DQ\ZDU\RIYLUXVUHRSHQLQJVDVSDUWLVDQGLYLGH
JURZV LQ 86¶ CTV News, 22 April 2020) < https://www.ctvnews.ca/health/coronavirus/many-wary-of-
virus-reopenings-as-partisan-divide-grows-in-u-s-1.4906794> accessed 17 May 2020 (discussing how the 
US is beset with µincreasingly partisan disagreements over how and when to restart its economy¶); Sam 
Adler-%HOOµ)DFHERRN,V5HPRYLQJ3URWHVW3DJHV7KDW¶VD7HUULEOH3UHFHGHQW¶Medium, 24 April 2020) 
<shorturl.at/ptL29 > accessed 17 May 2020 (discussing partisan disagreements in the US in response to 
)DFHERRN¶V UHPRYDO RI µcertain event pages for in-person rallies against coronavirus lockdowns in 
California, New Jersey, and Nebraska¶DQGµ&RURQDYLUXV%UD]LO¶V%ROVRQDURMRLns anti-ORFNGRZQSURWHVWV¶ 
(BBC, 20 April 2020) < https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-52351636> accessed 17 May 2020 
(discussing anti-lockdown protests in Brazil). 
38
  Brennen et al (n 14) 7. 
Notwithstanding these more stringent content policies, online platforms have nonetheless been 
confronted by two notable challenges concerning their enforcement. 
 
First, online platforms have had to contend with a significant reduction in the capacity of their 
human content moderators due to the logistical and privacy challenges of moderators working 
from home as a result of the Covid-19 crisis. Consequently, platforms have had to temporarily 
increase their use of machine learning and automated systems to detect and remove violating 
content and disable accounts. Significantly, platforms have been relatively candid about the 
fact that their automated systems sometimes lack the ability to accurately assess the context of 
content compared to human content moderators, leading to a higher number of mistakes than 
usual.39 
 
Second, online platforms have had to contend with the fact that substantial numbers of users 
are turning to private or invite-only areas of their sites to connect with the communities they 
care about ± spaces that tend to be more difficult for platforms to moderate. Research by 
POLITICO, for example, has identified the spread of falsehoods across more than 30 invite-
only Facebook groups dedicated to Covid-19, some of which have garnered tens of thousands 
of members.40 Facebook has implemented a number of measures to address this challenge, 
including an educational pop-up directing group members to credible information from health 
organizations, prompts to group admins to share live broadcasts about Covid-19 from health 
authorities, and a curriculum that group admins can share with members to learn how to stay 
safe during the crisis. Nonetheless, false or misleading information about Covid-19 remains an 
ongoing challenge within these more private spaces of platforms.41  
 
Taken together, these developments reveal not only the reactive nature of online platform 
governance, but also the complexity and impossibility of content moderation at scale. As 
Evelyn Douek has observed, confronted by the inevitability of error in addressing the Covid-
19 infodemic, online platforms have chosen µto err on the side of false positives and removing 
more content¶.42 In making this choice about error preference, platforms reveal µthe trade-offs 
between accuracy, comprehensive enforcement and speed [that] are inherent in every platform 
rule and not just in these exceptional moments¶.43 It is the capacity of platforms to make such 
choices, to determine how different interests should be balanced, that constitutes their power 
over how information circulates in the public domain and across the world. 
 
3 Online Platforms as Intermediary Fiduciaries under International Law 
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The centrality of online platforms to global information flows, both during moments of crisis 
like Covid-19 and everyday life, raises the question of how their role and behaviour may be 
understood from an international legal perspective, and consequently what standards and 
regulatory schemes should inform their actions. In this final section, we seek to contribute to 
the debate currently taking place concerning whether online platforms should be regulated, 
how they should be regulated, and what form and content such regulation might take. 
 
In our opinion, online platforms are intermediary fiduciaries of the international public good,44 
and for this reason regulation should be informed by relevant standards that apply to fiduciary 
relationships.45 
 
3.1 Fiduciary Relationships: States, People and the Public Good of Health  
A fiduciary relationship arises when a party is entrusted by another party, the entrustor, to serve 
her needs and deliver goods for her benefit. Fiduciary relations emerge because of certain social 
conditions, such as status, dependency, differentiated resources, or expertise.46 Fiduciary 
relations can take various forms and may arise in different legal settings. They can be broad in 
nature or served by an agent entrusted with wide powers. Alternatively, they can be more 
limited, confined to a particular service or good provided by a specialised agent. The ultimate 
and broadest fiduciary relationship is that between the state and its people.  
 
According to social contract theory,47 individuals entrust the state with powers to pursue public 
goods such as security, health, and welfare, because they do not have the ability and resources 
to enjoy and share the benefits of these goods in a constant and non-exclusionary manner. 
Therefore, they enter into a fiduciary relationship with the state, such that the sWDWH¶Vraison 
d'être and sovereign authority are linked to serving the people and delivering public goods. As 
Vatel wrote, µthe government was intrusted to him [the sovereign] only for the happiness of 
VRFLHW\«>DQG@KHXVHVWKHSXEOic power only with a view to the public welfare¶.48 This also 
means that the exercise of state power should be subject to certain standards and rules that 
derive from and aim at maintaining that fiduciary relationship. More specifically, the exercise 
of state power should not be self-interested, should take a holistic view of the public good, and 
should not be abused in view of the fact that the state is the ultimate fiduciary and power holder 
and individuals depend on the state for satisfying their needs. For this reason, the state accepts 
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limitations to the exercise of its power, with human rights law providing an example of 
limitations imposed on the state as a fiduciary.49      
 
In the absence of a global sovereign, States ± individually or collectively ± also become 
fiduciaries of humanity in delivering international public goods.50 Although international law 
recognises and accepts the national social contract and the right of States to pursue the public 
good as defined by their people, it also caters for the international pubic good because the 
national and international public good are interconnected and interdependent. States act in this 
instance as fiduciaries of the global community of peoples and by promoting the international 
public good, they also satisfy the national public good. One method of promoting the 
international public good is through an international organisation which acts in that instance as 
an intermediary fiduciary.  
 
Health is an international public good in the sense that it is a general and non-exclusive good 
with respect to which everyone is both a stakeholder and beneficiary.51 Global health requires 
collective action which is pursued through an international organisation, the WHO, for the 
benefit of all human beings and, distinctly, for the benefit of SWDWHV DQG IRU HDFK VWDWH¶V
population.52 Information disorder ± whether in the form of disinformation, misinformation, or 
malinformation ± can hinder or thwart the delivery of the international public good of health 
by creating confusion, doubt, division, insularity, or exclusion, as well as by preventing action 
or undermining the state and the international institutions whose mandate is to serve this public 
good. In essence, information disorder has the potential to undermine the fiduciary 
relationships outlined above. 
 
3.2 Online Platforms as Intermediary Fiduciaries of the International Public Good of Health  
By adopting a range of measures to address information disorder, online platforms become 
intermediary fiduciaries. They become intermediary fiduciaries because they interpose 
themselves between States on the one hand, which are fiduciaries of their own people and the 
national public good of health and, collectively, fiduciaries of humanity and the international 
public good of health, and on the other, the global community of peoples. In this way, online 
platforms claim for themselves a distinct and indeed important fiduciary role in the pursuit of 
the international public good of health, a role that cannot otherwise be justified or legitimised.  
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Although there is no formal delegation, their characterisation as intermediary fiduciaries is 
justified by the fact that platforms have assumed such power in conjunction with the fact that 
States and people entrust them with such power.53 However, it is not only how platforms project 
themselves or how they are perceived but, more crucially, it is the nature of their relationship 
with States and people that call for such a characterisation.54 As it has been opined, µdiscretion, 
power to act and vulnerability¶ can class a relationship as fiduciary and justify its regulation.55  
 
Applying these conditions to online platforms, we can say that, first, they own and operate 
critical resources which individuals or States do not own or operate. These resources are 
indispensable for the functioning of the State and for the fulfilment of public goods. 
Accordingly, States and peoples are in a position of vulnerability (as far as the operation and 
management of these resources is concerned) due to the power differentials and the dependency 
relations that are created. This is even more so when online platforms rely upon elaborate 
technologies of data surveillance.  
 
Secondly, online platforms exercise power in the sense that they can unilaterally modify human 
behaviour, adversely aIIHFW LQGLYLGXDOV¶ LQWHUHVWV, and alter their factual and often legal 
relations and circumstances. Governing the permissibility and visibility of content amounts to 
an exercise of power because it affects participation and information which are important 
conditions for making autonomous decisions, participating in an equal and informed manner 
in public life, and the formulation and realisation of the public good.  Even if their power may 
not be formally public ± in the sense of authorised by law or enforced by public sanctions ± it 
is nonetheless power in a functional sense: it is a means for attaining a certain goal. 
 
Thirdly, the power of online platforms is discretionary in the sense that they make unilateral 
and individualised decisions on how the public good can be secured against a very broadly 
defined concept of the public good and without the participation of those affected by their 
decisions. It is also discretionary because of the relations of dependency and vulnerability 
mentioned above. Individuals are thus subject to the exercise of discretionary power and to the 
extent that decisions are automated, they are subject to the constant exercise of algorithmic 
power. This inflates even more the discretionary power of online platforms. It can also detach 
it from the pursuit of the public good when algorithms are used to make decisions that are not 
contextualised, individualised, or accounted for. 
 
It becomes apparent from the above that fiduciary relations can be abused. The danger of abuse 
is even more serious in the case at hand. First, there are power differentials because, as 
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explained above, online platforms own the infrastructure and possess the technical expertise. 
Second, online platforms have their own interests and their own narrowly defined fiduciaries 
in the person of their shareholders ± which do not necessarily align with the pursuit of the 
international public good. Third, the use of algorithms may produce biases and make the 
exercise of power discriminatory or unequal. Fourth, although it is a general principle of law 
that discretionary power should not be delegated, online platforms routinely delegate power to 
algorithms, a particularly dangerous practice when their decision-making processes cannot be 
explained or understood which is necessary for review and accountability.56 As noted earlier, 
this practice has become even more prevalent during the Covid-19 infodemic due to reductions 
in the availability of human moderators. However, even if human moderators are available, 
questions may be asked about standards of training, the legal, social, cultural standards that 
apply, as well as levels of procedural transparency and accountability.57 Finally online 
platforms can expand their power by instrumentalising the pursuit of the public good of health, 
causing collateral detriment to other public goods. 
 
3.3 Online Platforms and International Law 
Treating online platforms as intermediary fiduciaries of the international public good has 
important regulatory implications. It reveals that market regulation, contract regulation, and 
self-regulation are inadequate models of regulation in this context because they cannot address 
adequately the problems that arise from fiduciary relationships, particularly the problem of 
abuse. For this reason, regulation should be legal.  
 
Regulation should be legal for four key reasons. Foremost, because law can authoritatively 
determine the structure and content of the fiduciary relationship. Second, it can moderate and 
balance often contradictory interests. Third, it can identify the goods to be served and how they 
will be served. Finally, regulation can provide mechanisms to prevent or address abuses of 
power, thus establishing accountability. In fact, individuals already resort to legal institutions 
to obtain protection if their status or rights have been abused by online platforms and when 
they feel that platform procedures are unsatisfactory. Even so, existing legal impediments 
confirm the need for smarter legal regulation.  
 
Such regulation may be comprehensive or limited to specific services and goods, such as 
health, but it should ensure that online platforms exercise their entrusted power in good faith, 
with due care, and within the bounds of the aims for which it has been entrusted. Regulation 
should also ensure that in exercising their fiduciary powers, online platforms respect the human 
dignity and needs of individuals and the personality and needs of States. 
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 Since the role of online platforms as intermediaries concerns the international public good, it 
is the community of States, which should lay down these rules. This means that regulation 
should be international rather than national and should comprise of a minimum international 
law framework.58 Equally, however, States should be able to contextualise domestic regulation 
with reference to domestic circumstances and needs, provided they respect the minimum 
international law standard. And, online platforms should be able to introduce their own 
community standards so long as they align with the minimum international and the relevant 
national regulatory standards. In this regard, it is interesting to note that certain online platforms 
already look to international human rights standards to make content-related decisions.59  
 
Although the scope and content of such a regulatory framework requires more detailed analysis 
± which is beyond the confines of this short piece ± the main takeaway is that applying a 
fiduciary framework to online platforms can recast the relationship between online platforms, 
peoples, and States under a different light. Doing so provides an indication of the ends, modes 
and content of regulation, as well as insight into how their power should be disciplined, and 
how online platforms should be made accountable. 
 
4 Conclusion: Beyond Platform Responsibility 
1HDUO\WZHQW\\HDUVDJR+LODU\&KDUOHVZRUWKREVHUYHGKRZLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ\HUVµUHYHOLQD
JRRGFULVLV¶ZKLFKRIWHQSURYLGHVµDIRFXVIRUWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHGLVFLSOLQHDQG«DOVR
DOORZV LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ\HUV WKHVHQVH WKDW WKHLUZRUN LVRI LPPHGLDWH LQWHQVHUHOHYDQFH¶60 
Writing in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, we believe that the present crisis does indeed 
provide an opportunity to catalyse regulation of online platforms under international law.61  
With this in mind, we have put forward a fiduciary model of regulation, which, we argue, 
provides a sound basis for determining how power can be distributed and how interests can be 
balanced among states, online platforms, and peoples in order to avoid abuse, attain the 
common good, and protect human dignity.  
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 $WWKHVDPHWLPHZHDUHDOVRPLQGIXORI&KDUOHVZRUWK¶VZDUQLQJWKDWLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZPD\
EHFRPHDPDVNIRUµLVVXHVRIVWUXFWXUDOMXVWLFHWKDWXQGHUSLQHYHU\GD\OLIH¶.62 Reflecting on the 
online platform ecosystem, it is apparent that many of the existing concerns that arise online 
are symptoms of deeper structural problems ± including social, economic and political 
inequalities that have been confronting societies around the world for generations. We, 
therefore, wish to conclude by emphasising that while the recognition of online platforms as 
intermediary fiduciaries under international law constitutes an important step in addressing 
contemporary challenges associated with the digital public sphere, it is essential that attention 
not be diverted from the broader distributional and societal divisions that underpin these 
challenges across the world.  
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